The typical tasks of system support and administration of an SAP landscape, regardless of whether it is 2-tier or multi-level, include the following
Enhancement Package Installation
Job scheduling: your system needs to run various automated background jobs that consume resources. Your administrator must carefully schedule these tasks when user demand is low so they don't impact performance.
This makes the technical user the dialogue user and a login in the SAP system is unrestricted. So Johannes logs in with the known password of the RFC user in the production system. Thanks to very extensive permissions, it now has access to all sorts of critical tables, transactions, and programmes in production. With the identity of the RFC user Johannes starts with the technical compromise of the production system... RFC Security: All invented - or everyday threat? Whether a simple trim, altered biometric properties or an encapsulated technical user in the SAP system: the basis of the compromise is the same. A person uses a different identity to gain access and permissions to protected areas. Moreover, the evil in all three stories could have been prevented by pro-activity. When was the last time you thought about the security of your RFC interfaces? Can you say with certainty that all your technical RFC users only have the permissions they actually need? And do you know who exactly knows the passwords of these users? Can you 100% rule out that not now in this moment an SAP user with a false identity infiltrates your production systems? Change now: It's about pro activity! But before you start now and start looking for the "identity converter" (which I really do not recommend!), I suggest that you take root of evil and proactively strengthen your RFC security. So if you want to find out more, I have the following 3 tips for you: 1) Our e-book about SAP RFC interfaces 2) Clean up our free webinar about RFC interfaces 3) Blog post about our approach to optimising RFC interfaces As always, I look forward to your feedback and comments directly below these lines!
If you want to get more information about SAP basis, visit the website www.sap-corner.de.
Oracle, MaxDB and MS SQL databases
The application layer is the core of an R/3 SAP Basis system. This layer communicates in both directions, to the presentation layer and to the database layer. The application programs on the application servers request the required data from the database layer, process it, prepare it for the user and pass it on to the presentation layer. Data that the user enters in the SAP GUI is passed on to the database via the application servers.
SAP will provide all SAP Notes in the SAP ONE Support Launchpad digitally signed. This is to increase the security when the updates are loaded. If you have unsigned SAP hints, there is a risk that the notice has been changed unnoticed and malicious code will be added to your SAP system when you install the notice. This poses a significant threat to the SAP system, which is why the digitally signed provision of the clues is an important improvement. However, to use digitally signed notes in your system, you will need to take a few steps to prepare them. If you install SAPCAR version 7.2 or later and have a user with the necessary permissions, all you have to do is insert the Note 2408073 into your system and do the manual pre- and post-processing. A digital signature technically ensures that any change can be detected at the notice and can be checked by the system to see if the present note, which is to be inserted into the system, is unchanged. Prerequisites to use digitally signed SAP hints To prepare your SAP system for digitally signed clues, you first have to meet some requirements: Digital signed SAP hints are provided as SAR files. The SAR files are unpacked with SAPCAR and checked for their digital signature. SAPCAR must be available on the Application Server in version 7.20 or higher. Therefore, it is strongly advised to update SAPCAR. If SAPCAR is not at least in version 7.20, the digital signature verification fails and the message cannot be unzipped. Installation of the digitally signed clue is then not possible. The implementing user also needs some permissions to perform the necessary manual pre- and post-processing of the note on the system: Authentication for the transaction SLG1 Read permission for the S_APPL_LOG permission to write and delete data from the application directory Upgrade the SAPCAR version on your system to version 7.20 or higher SAP basis version 700 or higher, for older versions the notice must be inserted manually If you have met these requirements, you can use the implementation of note 24080 Start 73. Implementation SAP Note number 2408073.
"Shortcut for SAP Systems" is a PC application that simplifies or even facilitates many activities in the SAP basis.
The core of the three-layer model is the application layer.
To store all the information on the subject of SAP - and others - in a knowledge database, Scribble Papers is suitable.
A positive aspect of standardisation and automation is the increase in the quality of tasks, since manual errors can be almost excluded.